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## TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START I)

**Signed:** 31 July 1991

**Entered into Force:** 5 December 1994

**Duration:** 15 year duration with option to extend for unlimited five year periods, if all parties agree.

**Parties:** United States, Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

### [Treaty Text](#)

**Treaty Obligations:** The treaty limits the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for United States and Russia to 1,600 each, the total number of accountable warheads to 6,000 each, total number of warheads mounted on ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) to 4,900 each, total number of warheads mounted on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 each, and the total ballistic missile throw-weight for each party to 3,600 metric tons (t). Additionally, START I permits Russia to have no more than 154 so-called "heavy" ICBMs (defined as having launch weight greater than 106t or a throw-weight greater than 4,350kg), specifically the R-36M-series [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan,' START designation RS-20] ICBMs, and no more than 1,540 warheads mounted on these missiles. The treaty also bans the construction of new types of heavy ICBMs and SLBMs, although it permits modernization programs and, in exceptional cases, new silo construction.

START I also bans the testing of missiles with a greater number of warheads than declared in the treaty, and bans any new ballistic missiles with more than 10 warheads. Parties to the treaty may also reduce the number of warheads attributed to a specific missile. However, no more than three existing missile types may have the number of warheads reduced, and the total reduction may not exceed 1,250 warheads. New missile types or heavy ICBMs may not be downloaded.

While the treaty counts each ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicle as a single warhead, counting rules for warheads attributed to heavy bombers are more complicated. Each Russian heavy bomber equipped to

carry long-range nuclear ALCMs (defined as having maximum range of 600km or more), up to a total of 180 bombers, counts as eight warheads toward the 6,000 warhead limit, even though existing Russian heavy bomber types can carry between six and 16 ALCMs. Each Russian heavy bomber above the level of 180 has its actual number of ALCMs counted toward the 6,000 warhead limit. Similarly, each US long-range nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bomber, up to a total of 150 bombers, counts as 10 warheads toward the 6,000 warhead limit, and each bomber in excess of 150 has the actual number of ALCMs it can carry counted toward the warhead limit. Bombers not equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs are counted as one warhead.

**Verification and Compliance:** START I contains extensive provisions for verification, including the use of National Technical Means, missile test telemetry tape exchanges, periodic data exchanges, monitoring activities, and on-site inspections.

### **Developments:**

**2009:** On 13 January, Secretary of State Clinton stated during her confirmation hearing that the U.S. was committed to working with Russia to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of the START treaty and towards an agreement for further reductions.

On 6 February, Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov stated at the Munich Security Conference that Moscow was committed to continuing the START negotiations process but maintained concerns regarding uploading procedures and the U.S. planned missile defense system in Europe. At the same conference, U.S. Vice President Biden stated that Russia and the U.S. should cooperate "to renew the verification procedures in the START treaty."

On 7 March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, noted that as part of their effort to rebuild bilateral relations they

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would try to reach an agreement on a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of 2009.

On 1 April, at the G-20 meeting in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev emphasized the need for lower levels of strategic offensive arms, including delivery vehicles and warheads, than those determined by the SORT agreement, and including verification measures “drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START Treaty.” Both leaders underlined their plan to conclude the agreement before the START I expiration date in December 2009.

The U.S. and Russian negotiating teams, headed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Anatoly Antonov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department, held their first “very productive” meeting in Rome on 24 April. The first round of negotiations followed in Moscow 18-20 May.

Both the second and the third round of negotiations took place in Geneva 1-4 and 23-24 June. On 6 July, during a bilateral meeting in Moscow, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to guide the negotiations, committing their countries to ranges of 1500-1675 for strategic warheads and 500-1100 for strategic delivery vehicles, and a treaty including effective verification measures drawn from the experience gained under START I.

At the same 6-7 July summit, the two Presidents underlined their plans to continue the discussions regarding cooperative approaches in response to missile proliferation. They noted that U.S. and Russian experts were “intensifying dialogue on establishing the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is to become the basis for a multilateral missile-launch notification regime.”

The fourth round of negotiations took place in Geneva 22-24 July.

**2008:** On 7 April, after a bilateral meeting in Sochi, Russia, Putin stated that Russia was to continue working with the U.S. to maintain all the useful and necessary parts of the START treaty.

On 9 April, the United States announced that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program completed the elimination of SS-24 “scalpel” ICBM, including their supporting components, in accordance to START I obligations.

On 29 May, Russia announced that it had dismantled 36 outdated Topol mobile ballistic missile systems in 2007 and twelve in two consecutive operations in

March and May 2008 under the provisions of the START I treaty.

On 11 September, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated Russia was still awaiting concrete proposals from the U.S., a statement confirming Russian sources contending that the U.S. had not supplied necessary working papers to move the negotiation process forward.

On 29 September, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the bilateral negotiations on the future of START were “not so far heading anywhere.”

**2007:** In March, U.S. and Russia commenced bilateral consultations at the level of the deputy minister to explore a post-START agreement, including a possible extension of certain verification elements of the treaty.

In July, statements were made at an informal meeting between U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kennebunkport, Maine, expressing support for the replacement of START I, which expires at the end of 2009. While there were no direct talks pertaining to the START I treaty during the meeting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented that both countries were committed to reducing strategic arms levels to “the lowest possible level consistent with their national security requirements.” Supporters of the START treaty process expressed hope that the dialogue was to encourage a disarmament discussion in the future.

**2001:** On 4 January, the Russian Defense Ministry accused the United States of violating its START I obligations of disarmament in regards to the U.S. LGM-118A Peacekeeper ICBM. The United States considered destroying the first stage of the Peacekeeper to be sufficient under START I guidelines. However, the Russian Defense Ministry contended that all stages of the missile must be destroyed under START I. In response, the Pentagon claimed that the second and third stages of the Peacekeeper are used for space launch vehicles, which are permitted under START I.

On 24 August the United States announced the destruction of the last Minuteman III silo at Grand Forks, North Dakota.

On 30 October, Ukraine completed its compliance obligation under the START I Treaty by destroying its last SS-24 ICBM silo.

On 13 November President Putin announced that in late October the last Ukrainian nuclear warhead had been destroyed in Russia.

On 5 December the United States and Russia announced that both parties had fulfilled START I requirements. In particular, Russia announced that it had reduced its deployed strategic delivery vehicles to 1136 and its accountable warheads to 5518. This accomplishment marked the largest arms control reduction in history.

**1997:** In congruence with START I obligations, on 22 December the United States announced that the last Minuteman II silo was destroyed at Whiteman Air Force Base.

**1996:** On 23 November, after transferring its remaining ICBMs and nuclear warheads to Russia, Belarus announced that it had fulfilled its START I and NPT obligations and officially became a Non-nuclear weapon state.

**1995:** On 9 November, a revision of the START I treaty was signed in Geneva, allowing converted mobile strategic missiles to be used as space launchers.

On 1 March, START I baseline inspections began and lasted 120 days.

**1994:** On 5 December at the Budapest Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine exchanged instruments of ratification for START I, thereby marking the treaty's entry into force.

In May, the Joint Commission on Inspection and Compliance met in Geneva to discuss the implementation details of START I. Representatives from the

United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed several agreements that will help to realize the multilateral obligations of START I.

**1993:** On 18 November the Ukrainian Parliament ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol. However, given Ukraine's serious reservations about the Treaties, doubts arose concerning Ukraine's commitment to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

On 2 July Kazakhstan ratified START I and subsequently acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on 14 February 1994.

On 23 April, President Clinton announced an accelerated reduction schedule for U.S. strategic forces under START I in an attempt to further strengthen disarmament and security measures.

On 4 February, Belarus ratified START I, the Lisbon Protocol and acceded to the NPT.

**1992:** On 4 November, Russia ratified START I. However, Russia announced that it would not exchange its instrument of ratification until Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

On 23 May, the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol in Portugal. Furthermore, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states in "the shortest possible time".

**1991:** On 31 July, President Bush and President Gorbachev signed START I. The Treaty was expected to cut strategic warheads arsenals by approximately 35%.

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## TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (START II)

**Signed:** 3 January 1993

**Ratified by US Senate:** 26 September 1997

**Ratified by the Russian State Duma:** 14 April 2000

**Ratified by the Russian Federation Council:** 19 April 2000

**Russia Declares It Null and Void:** 14 June 2002

### [Treaty Text](#)

#### **Extension Protocol:**

**Signed:** 26 September 1997

**Ratified by the Russian State Duma:** 14 April 2000

**Ratified by the Russian Federation Council:** 19 April 2000

**US Letter on Early Deactivation:** 26 September 1997

**Russian Letter on Early Deactivation:** 26 September 1997

The US Senate Ratification Resolution included a provision requiring the president to seek Senate approval of any strategic arms cuts that would reduce the US strategic arsenal to below START I ceilings before START II entered into force. Russian State Duma START II Ratification Law required the US Senate to ratify the Extension Protocol and the 1997 ABM Demarcation Agreements for ratification instruments to be exchanged and for the Treaty to enter into force.

On 14 June 2002, the Russian Federation announced its withdrawal from START II due to US refusal to ratify the Treaty and to US withdrawal from the [ABM Treaty](#). The Treaty is no longer in effect.

**Treaty Obligations:** START II complemented, rather than replaced, the earlier START I, in that the earlier Treaty's provisions remain unchanged unless specifically modified by START II. START II was to remain in force for the duration of START I.

START II established a limit on strategic weapons for each Party, with reductions to be implemented in two phases. By the end of Phase I, the United States and Russia were to reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250, including no

more than 2,160 warheads deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), no more than 650 on heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and no more than 1,700-1,750 on SLBMs. By the end of Phase II, each Party's total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads was not to exceed 3,000-3,500. Of this number, no more than 1,700-1,750 were to be deployed on SLBMs. Phase II required the elimination of all heavy ICBMs and all ICBMs on multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) (although some of the latter were to be downloaded to one warhead). The MIRV ban did not apply to SLBMs.

Initially, Phase I was to be fully implemented within seven years of the entry into force of START I, and Phase II was to be fully implemented by 1 January 2003. However, these timeframes were extended to 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2007, respectively, by a Protocol to the Treaty signed by US and Russian representatives on 27 September 1997. In spite of this delay, both sides pledged to deactivate all weapons to be eliminated under START II by 31 December 2003. The fixed implementation deadline of START II made it unusual among arms control treaties, and the delays in ratifying it by both the United States and the Russian Federation, as well as the unexpectedly early entry into force of START I on 5 December 1994, required an extension to these deadlines.

START II modified START I missile "downloading" rules governing which MIRVed missiles may be converted to a single-warhead configuration. START II allowed each side to download two existing types of missiles by up to four warheads per missile, with no limit on the total number of missiles or warheads affected. Each side was also allowed to download 105 ICBMs by up to five warheads per missile. In practice, these conditions meant Russia may download 105 of its UR-100Ns [NATO designation SS-19 "Stiletto," START designation RS-18], the only Russian in-service ICBM that qualified for downloading, and was to deactivate all of its 10-warhead RT-23UTTKh [NATO designation SS-24 "Scalpel," START designation RS-22] ICBMs.

START II missile system elimination rules were generally similar to those of START I in that they required that the missile's silo was to be eliminated or converted to carry a Treaty-permitted missile type. The sole exception to this rule was the R-36M [NATO designation SS-18 "Satan," START designation RS-20] ICBMs, which were to be destroyed along with their silos. START II allowed 90 R-36M silos to be converted for use by single-warhead missiles, however, which meant that the Russian elimination quota was 64 out of 154 R-36M silos.

In contrast to START I, START II calculated nuclear warheads attributed to heavy bombers by counting the number of warheads each heavy bomber is actually capable of carrying. Additionally, START II allowed each side to convert up to 100 heavy bombers to conventional roles. Such bombers would not be counted against the START II warhead limit provided they had observable differences from nuclear-capable bombers of the same type and were not based at the same locations as nuclear-capable bombers. Each side was to convert such bombers to a nuclear role following a three-month notification but was not to subsequently reconvert them to a conventional role.

#### **Verification and Compliance:**

**Verification:** Like the provisions of its predecessor, START II provisions would have been verified by on-site inspections, including observation of differences on heavy bombers converted to conventional roles, and missile and silo elimination or conversion. Silo conversions were also subject to inspection. START II provided for inspections in addition to those called for in START. START II provided for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections to confirm the conversions of heavy ICBM silo launchers. In addition, START II provided for exhibitions and inspections to observe the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers were actually equipped and their relevant observable differences. These additional inspections were to be carried out according to the provisions of START unless otherwise specified in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or in the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol.

**Compliance:** To provide a forum for discussion of implementation of START II, the Treaty established the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). Through the BIC, the Parties could have resolved questions of compliance and agreed upon additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

**START III:** During a meeting in Helsinki in March 1997, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin adopted a Joint Statement that committed both countries to begin START III negotiations as soon as START II entered into force. The two sides began consultations on strategic stability in the summer of 1997 and continued until the fall of 2000. During the September 1998 summit in Moscow, the two presidents reaffirmed their commitment to begin formal START III negotiations after Russia's ratification of START II. In 2000 the United States and Russia exchanged draft START III texts.

The basic provisions of START III, as laid out in the Helsinki Joint Statement of 21 March 1997, included reducing the aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads to 2,000-2,500 per side, establishing strategic nuclear inventory transparency measures, ensuring irreversibility of the reductions, and making START I and II unlimited in duration. The Joint Statement also included language supporting confidence-building and transparency measures concerning long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons, which would be explored as separate issues in the START III context.

In 2000, the Russian Federation officially proposed a lower aggregate level ceiling of 1,000-1,500, a position which did not receive US support. Since the beginning of START III discussions, the Russian Federation made START III negotiations contingent on US support for the preservation of the ABM Treaty.

#### **Developments:**

**2002:** On 13 June, US President Bush declared that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which he had announced 6 months earlier in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, was formally taking effect, thereby marking the end of the ABM Treaty. On 14 June, the Russian Federation announced its withdrawal from the START II Treaty due to US refusal to ratify the Treaty and to US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

**2001:** Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov announced on 11 December that Russia would not begin implementing the provisions of START II until the United States ratified the Treaty. Ivanov said that since the United States had not yet ratified it, the Treaty had not entered into force and therefore Russia was not obligated to carry out the required reductions of its strategic forces.

During a press conference held on 19 December following the conclusion of a NATO conference in Brussels, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov

stated that, as a result of the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, START II would never enter into force. According to Ivanov the US decision caused not only the “disappearance of the entire legal mechanism regulating the reductions of strategic offensive armaments,” but also undermined all existing nonproliferation agreements and nuclear testing treaties, and even the supplementary protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.

**2000:** The Duma ratified START II by a vote of 288-131 with four abstentions at its 14 April session. Ratification required 226 votes. The Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Federal Assembly, ratified the Treaty on 19 April.

Vladimir Putin signed the START II Ratification Law on 4 May. The law was to enter into force on the date of its publication in the official government newspaper, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*. However, the Treaty itself was not to enter into force until the conditions contained in the ratification law were fulfilled.

On 10 May, the U.S. House Armed Forces Committee defeated a proposal to unilaterally reduce the strategic forces to START II levels before the treaty entered into force.

**1999:** A summit meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin was held on 20 June in Cologne, Germany on the last day of the annual summit of the Group of Eight nations. The two presidents agreed to hold preliminary consultations on START III and to begin discussions on “possibly reopening” the 1972 ABM treaty on 17-19 August in Moscow. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott will be the head of the US delegation to the talks. According to Sandy Berger, President Clinton's national security adviser, this is the first time that Russia has agreed to discuss changes to the ABM Treaty. In the Russia-US joint statement released in Cologne, the two sides recognized the “fundamental importance” of the Treaty and reaffirmed their current obligations under Article XIII “to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty.” The two governments also pledged to “do everything in their power to facilitate the successful completion of the START II ratification processes in both countries.” Despite the agreement to consider possible changes to the ABM Treaty, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that the US plan to deploy the nation-wide ABM system “is dangerous and can destroy the basis of strategic stability and the whole disarmament process” and expressed hope that “Rus-

sia and the US will be factors of stability and security.”

**1998:** In its report START II: Prospects for Ratification released on 28 April, the Analytic Directorate of the Duma argued that START II should be ratified only if the Treaty is amended to include a series of supplemental proposals. The report recommended that the ratification legislation should encompass the principle of equal reduction for both Russian and US strategic forces. To justify its position, the report cited the conditions the US Senate added when it ratified START II in January 1996. The report echoed START II opponents' criticism that the United States had secured for itself terms that allowed “reducing without destroying,” which would enable the United States to swiftly increase its nuclear strike potential should a crisis situation develop. US strategic nuclear forces rely heavily on SLBMs, from which some nuclear warheads must be removed, but not destroyed, under the terms of START II.

In an interview given on 12 May, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov stated that any US economic sanctions against Russian companies suspected of selling missile technology to Iran would likely affect the chances of START II being ratified by the Duma. Referring to accusations that Russian firms are assisting the Iranian missile program, Primakov stated that “Russia does not seek to advance Iran's missile industry,” and said that Russia had no reason “to encourage the creation of a missile with a range of 2,000 kilometers in Iran.” Primakov added, though, that he and Defense Minister Igor Sergeev should be able to persuade Duma members to ratify the Treaty.

In a 45-minute meeting at the close of the G-8 summit with US President Bill Clinton in Birmingham, England on 17 May, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said that his administration would step up its efforts for START II ratification by Russia's reluctant parliament. During the talks, Clinton again linked the timing of the next US-Russian summit with the ratification of START II, saying that he would like to hold a summit meeting in Moscow this year to discuss further arms reduction talks, but adding that Washington would first like to see the Russian Federal Assembly ratify START II.

In a resolution adopted on 21 August, the Duma voiced “deep concern in connection with the US missile strikes at targets in Sudan and Afghanistan,” which were launched by Washington in retaliation for the August 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. The non-binding resolution, passed 264-0 with two ab-

stentions, argued that the missile strikes violated international law and the UN Charter, and termed them an act of aggression. The resolution asserted that such action on the part of the United States would prompt deputies to “weigh most thoroughly all the pluses and minuses of ratification of the START II Treaty.” The Duma has often tried to link its ratification of START II to US foreign policy regarding other issues, including NATO enlargement, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

At their 1-3 September summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton reiterated yet again their pledges to push for further reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, but were unable to report any concrete steps toward the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma. According to a joint statement issued by the two leaders, “Russia and the United States will continue to fulfill their commitments of the ABM and START arms reduction agreements and cooperate for accelerated ratification of START II by Russia.” The two presidents also repeated their pledge, made at their Helsinki summit in March 1997 that after START II is ratified, talks will begin on START III.

The draft of the revised law on START II ratification prepared by the Duma was published on 9 December in the PIR Center Arms Control Letter. As expected, Article II of the law specifies a number of “extraordinary events,” which would “give the Russian Federation the right to withdraw from the [START II] Treaty.” These include violation of START II by the United States; a build-up of nuclear weapons by States not party to START II; “military deployment” decisions by the United States or NATO that “threaten the national security of the Russian Federation,” including the deployment of nuclear weapons in countries which have joined NATO since 1993; the deployment by any country of weapons that threaten the Russian early warning system; and “technical” or “economic” events that make it impossible for Russia to implement the Treaty or jeopardize its “environmental security.” The Duma’s version of the bill also includes a number of conditions that must be met before Russia would exchange instruments of ratification with the United States, the final step which would allow START II to enter into force. Among these are the ratification by the United States of the ABM Demarcation Agreements signed by the United States and Russia in September 1997. These agreements face opposition in the US Senate, which could refuse to ratify them, creating another potential obstacle to the implementation of START II.

In the wake of US and British air strikes against Iraq that began on 16 December 1998, Russian Presiden-

tial Representative to the State Duma Alexander Kotenkov expressed doubt that the current Duma would ratify START II. Kotenkov said on 17 December that “ratification is unlikely to take place until a new Duma has been elected.” The following Duma elections were scheduled for December 1999. The Duma reacted angrily to the US-led air strikes on Iraq, terming them “barbaric” and “an act of international terrorism” in a resolution adopted on 17 December by the vote of 394-1 with two abstentions.

**1997:** Meeting with his U.S. counterpart Bill Clinton in Helsinki on 21 March, Russian President Boris Yeltsin pledged to push for speedy ratification of START II by the Russian Federal Assembly. In an attempt to accelerate ratification of the Treaty, Clinton and Yeltsin issued a joint statement on the “[Parameters of Future Nuclear Reductions](#).” The statement was targeted at Russian parliamentary critics of START II. Under its terms, the deadline for dismantling the strategic delivery systems slated for elimination under START II would be extended from 2003 to 2007. This provision would allow Russia to spread out the cost of destroying its multiple-warhead land-based ICBMs, addressing the cost concerns of some Russian parliamentarians. Clinton and Yeltsin also outlined a proposed START III that would reduce both countries’ strategic arsenals to the level of 2,500-2,000 warheads by 2007.

This proposed treaty, with its lower warhead ceiling, would save Russia the expense of building several hundred new single-warhead land-based missiles to match US force levels under START II. However, the United States insisted that negotiations on START III could not begin until after START II has been ratified, although many Russian critics of START II have said that they would prefer to scrap the Treaty and immediately begin talks on START III. According to Clinton administration officials, the joint statement provides for “reciprocity,” since now the downloading of both US Minuteman III and Russian SS-19 ICBMs does not have to be completed until the end of 2007.

Meeting in New York, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and his US counterpart Madeleine Albright signed a Protocol to START II on 26 September, extending the deadline for destruction of weapons systems slated for elimination under the Treaty from 2003 to 2007. In addition to the Protocol, the two foreign ministers exchanged letters in which the United States and Russia pledged that pending their destruction; these systems would be “deactivated” by 2003. The letters specified that deactivation will be carried out by “removing the nuclear re-

entry vehicles from the missiles, or by taking other jointly agreed steps.” The Russian letter contained a unilateral declaration that “the Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that well in advance of the above deactivation deadline the START III treaty will be achieved and will enter into force,” a statement which the United States took note of in its letter.

The Protocol and letters formally codified the agreement reached by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the Helsinki Summit in March 1997. The United States and Russia also released a joint agreed statement that enables the United States to download (remove) warheads from its Minuteman III ICBMs “at any time” before 31 December 1997. Under the terms of START I, Washington would previously have been required to download two warheads from its three-warhead Minuteman III missiles by 5 December 2001, effectively converting them into single-warhead ICBMs.

**1996:** On 26 January, upon notification of the U.S. Senate’s ratification of START II (by an 84-7 vote), Russian President Yeltsin called U.S. President Bill Clinton pledging to push the Russian parliament to ratify the Treaty before the G-7 Moscow summit on nuclear safety in April. (The Russian constitution requires the Treaty’s ratification by both houses of parliament.)

On 17 October, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed the State Duma Committees on Defense and International Affairs, arguing in favor of ratification of START II. According to Russian and Western reports, Perry was accorded a cool reception and his speech failed to impress the Duma. Shorter presentations by Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Lieberman fared no better. Senator Lugar stressed that further funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs would not be forthcoming without START II ratification.

**1995:** A Russian Duma internal report dated 26 October recommended modifying START II in order to allow Russia to continue deploying multiple-warhead ICBMs. The report also recommended that Russian START II ratification be conditioned upon completion of a US-Russian agreement on regional missile defenses. But Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergei Yushenkov was quoted saying that “the Duma is unlikely to ratify the START II treaty in the near future, judging by the atmosphere of the deputies.”

**1994:** On 28 September, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton issued a joint statement that included their intention to seek early ratification of START II. Clinton

and Yeltsin also stated that once START II was ratified, the United States and Russia were to deactivate the missiles slated for destruction under the Treaty by removing their warheads and removing them from alert status.

**1992:** In the State of the Union address on 28 January, U.S. President George Bush proposed further strategic arms reduction to an unspecified limit (reportedly, to 4,700 warheads) under the condition of complete elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs. In the context of such an agreement, he promised to download the number of warheads on Minuteman ICBMs from three to one, to reduce the number of warheads on SLBMs by one-third compared to the START I projected SLBM force, and to convert “a substantial portion” of heavy bombers “to primarily conventional use.” He also announced a unilateral decision to terminate the B-2 program at 20 heavy bombers instead of the previously planned 75, cancelled the small ICBM program, ended production of new warheads for SLBMs, and terminated purchases of additional advanced cruise missiles.

The day following President Bush's address, Russian President Yeltsin, in a special televised statement, suggested a warhead limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads, reportedly with the de-MIRVing of both ICBMs and SLBMs. Yeltsin also declared that Russia had unilaterally terminated the production of its heavy bombers (Tu-160 and Tu-95MS), as well as long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and proposed renouncing the creation of new types of such missiles on a bilateral basis. He announced that Russia would no longer conduct exercises involving more than 30 heavy bombers, and had reduced by half the number of submarines with SLBMs on patrol. He proposed that Russia and the United States agree on detargeting their nuclear weapons.

On 17 June, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed the “[joint understanding](#),” on which START II is based. This agreement committed Russia and the United States to a two-phase reduction of their strategic offensive arms to the level of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003, or “if the United States can contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia,” by the year 2000. The agreement also called for elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs, a limit of 1,750 on the warheads of SLBMs, and a “real” account of warheads on heavy bombers (START I established an “average” number of warheads assigned to each heavy bomber, lower than the actual number of weapons deployed on each of them). The agreement also permitted the “reorientation” of heavy bombers from



nuclear to conventional roles without additional conversion.

**1991:** U.S. President George Bush proposed on 27 September to “use START I as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing reductions.” In particular, he said that the United States would unilaterally terminate the program of development of the mobile MX Peacekeeper ICBM and proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union agree on the elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs.

On 5 October, responding to the initiatives proposed by U.S. President George Bush, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the deployment and modernization of MIRVed mobile ICBMs would be terminated and all rail-mobile ICBMs would remain in their permanent basing areas. The Soviet Union promised to unilaterally reduce its strategic nuclear weapons to 5,000 warheads instead of the 6,000 provided for under START I and proposed immediately, upon ratification of START I, to begin negotiations on reduction by half of the remaining strategic arsenals.

**1990:** During a summit meeting in Washington in June, still in the middle of START I negotiations, U.S. President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed a [Joint Statement](#) that outlined the two sides’ approach to the next START treaty. The statement expressed the intention to reduce strategic offensive arms “in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability,” in particular through reduction of “concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles” and increasing survivability of systems. They agreed that the agreement would include “measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs.”