Data Science in Nuclear Disarmament Verification - Extracting Verification-relevant Information from Geospatial Big Data

INTRODUCTION

Verification-relevant information includes

- information provided by States, mainly reports and declarations
- information from verification activities
- information from open sources and third parties.

Data collected, processed, integrated, analyzed and managed for verification purposes is not only increasing in volume, but also getting more heterogeneous, unstructured and complex in nature.

Data science and modern data analytical tools can pave the way to a more effective exploitation of 'big data' in nuclear verification.

STATE-OF-THE-ART

Automation of open source information collection and processing

• e.g. IAEA (1), KCL (2)

Natural language processing

• e.g. University of New South Wales (3)

Supporting safeguards inspection activities and information analysis by machine learning (CNN, SVM)

• e.g. SNL (4,5), LLNL (6), BNNL (7), Aquila (8), Jülich (9)

Data integration using semantic graphs

• e.g. SNL (10)

Improving reporting, matching, tracking and monitoring by block chain/shared ledger technologies

• e.g. PNNL (11, 12), JRC Ispra (13)

REFERENCES

(1)	Claude F et al (2017) Data Fusion at Scale: Strengthening Safeguards Conclusions Through Applied Analytics. Proc. INMM Annual Meeting, Indian Wells, CA
(2)	Stewart I et al (2018) Automated Processing of Open Source Information for Nonproliferation Purposes. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management 46(3):21-36
(3)	Diab JJ et al (2018) Using Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing to Enhance Uranium Mining and Milling Safeguards. Proc. IAEA Symposium on Interna Safeguards, Vienna
(4)	Gastelum Z et al (2018) Inferring the Operational Status of Nuclear Facilities with Convolutional Neural Networks to Support International Safeguards Verification. Jou Nuclear Materials Management 46(3):37-47
(5)	Haddal R et al (2018) Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence and Safeguards. Proc. IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna
(6)	Feldman Y (2018) Toward a Multimodal-Deep Learning Retrieval System for Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation Activities. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management 46(3):
(7)	Cui Y et al (2018) Using Deep Machine Learning to Conduct Object-bases Identification and Motion Detection on Safeguards Video Surveillance Proc. IAEA Symposi International Safeguards, Vienna
(8)	Kadner S et al (2017) Image Verification and Surveillance using Machine Learning. Proc. Workshop 'Novel Technologies, Techniques, and Methods for Safeguards and Control Verification', Sandia National Laboratories
(9)	Niemeyer I et al (2012): Object-based Image Analysis Using Very High-resolution Satellite Data. Journal of Nuclear Management (JNMM) 40 (4) Special Issue: Scien Verification, 100-109
(10)	Thomas MA et al (2018) Semantic Graphs for Safeguards Data Integration, Pattern Mataching, and Event Classification. Proc. IAEA Symposium on International Safeg Vienna
(11)	Frazer SL et al (2017) Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology. Technical Report, PNNL-26229, Pacific Northwest Na Laboratory
(12)	Frazar SL (2018) Identifying Safeguards Use Cases for Blockchain Technology. Proc. IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna
(13)	Nonnenman St et al (2018) Distributed Ledger Technology Used in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards? Exploratory Research project with focus on EURATOM. Proc Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna

i.niemeyer@fz-juelich.de, http://www.fz-juelich.de/iek/iek-6/safeguards-security

Imgard Niemeyer Nuclear Safeguards & Security IEK-6: Nuclear Waste Management and Reactor Safety March 2020



ium on

Arms nce for guards, IAFA

Data analytical tools are expected to pave the way to a more effective exploitation of geospatial 'big data' in support of nuclear disarmament verification.

Member of the Helmholtz Association




The first subproject aims at developing an automated procedure that allows for an effective integrated analysis of any number of geospatial data acquired over the same area of interest and providing a suitable visualisation of relevant trends, patterns and anomalies of verification-relevant information in the area of interest.

Categories of verification-relevant geospatial information types to be considered: 1. Image data from earth observation satellites;

- 2. Information derived from satellite imagery;
- 3. Supplementary geospatial datasets obtained from other open sources.

Part of



HDS-LEE is part of the newly founded JARA Center for Simulation and Data Sciences (JARA-CSD), created as a unique, internationally visible competence center for computer- and data-infrastructures, user support as well as methodological and disciplinary research in the fields of simulation, data analysis and high-performance computing technologies.





Advance and prioritize the development and implementation of relevant data sciences methods and techniques

Identify complex data analysis problems in nuclear disarmament verification that may potentially be mitigated or solved by data science

Investigate and evaluate data science methods and techniques that were established in non-nuclear verification sectors with regard to their potential suitability for nuclear disarmament verification

Analyze and prioritize needs and objectives of promoting data science in nuclear safeguards.

(Further) develop and evaluate specific data science methods and techniques.

SCHOOL FOR DATA SCIENCE

HDS

http://www.hds-lee.de