

**Deferred verification:**  
Verifiable declarations of fissile material stocks

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**THE CHALLENGE**

Nuclear disarmament is impossible without a **verifiable end of production of fissile materials for weapons**, i.e. the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

How to account for existing stocks of fissile materials in FMCT?

Declarations, if made, should be **legally binding and verifiable**

Large amounts of materials are **in weapons**, where no access or verification is possible

**DEFERRED VERIFICATION**

Amount of material in weapons is known (to the owner) with **high accuracy**

This amount can be declared **without compromising sensitive information** about weapons

**Correctness** of this declaration is verified when weapons are eliminated, and the material is sent to disposition


**Completeness** is verified by closing the material balance in the entire nuclear complex

**RESULTS**

The declaration can be **legally binding and verifiable**

**No access is required** to nuclear weapons or weapon materials

# Declarations of fissile material stocks can be legally binding and verifiable, even if fissile materials are in weapons



**HOW WOULD IT WORK?**

The entire nuclear complex is divided into **two segments – open and closed**

**OPEN SEGMENT**

What's included:

- All fissile material production facilities
- All civilian and non-proscribed military activities

Verification:

- Cooperative program of verification
- Physical inventory
- Closing the material balance
- Gradual opening of the records: production, removals, transfers
- Verification of all new production

**CLOSED SEGMENT**

What's included?

- Deployed weapons
- Weapons in reserve
- Weapon components
- Classified materials

Verification:

- No verification inside the segment
- No need to access nuclear warheads or classified materials
- All removals are accurately accounted for (removed material is in unclassified form)
- The segment becomes open when all material is removed

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