

**INMM Annual Meeting | Nonproliferation and Arms Control**  
**International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV):**  
**Necessary Preparation for Future Arms Control**

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## **Introduction**

History has demonstrated that nuclear arms control is often an opportunistic venture. Rapid changes in the international security situation and domestic politics have presented unexpected and often surprising opportunities for significant advances in efforts to limit, reduce, and ultimately eliminate thousands of nuclear weapons over the past half century. Unfortunately, in almost all cases, an understanding of how to effectively verify these reductions and eliminations was not well understood or documented when the opportunity presented itself. Even as fifty years of bilateral nuclear arms control comes to an end, it is vital to take advantage of today's "break in the action" to bring together experts to think through the possible needs for verification of future, more intrusive arms control. Leveraging today's quiet period is all the more important because future arms control will need to involve other countries beyond the United States and Russia in ways still to be determined.

Ensuring that our collective "homework" is done well in advance will enable future negotiators and government experts to craft nuclear weapons reduction and elimination agreements that are effectively verifiable and easily implemented. The confidence that comes from all parties sharing a common understanding of verification principles and mechanisms should result in more cooperative negotiations and shorter timelines to reach agreement on further reductions of global nuclear arsenals.

The work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) offers a jumping-off point for such an effort. Its goal has been to identify potential technical solutions to the challenges of future nuclear disarmament verification resulting in the development of a "toolkit" of verification mechanisms.

The IPNDV is one of several multilateral initiatives addressing nuclear disarmament verification involving think tanks, research facilities and academia in addition to government experts. These efforts share the desire to develop effective verification for use in future nuclear arms control agreements. Continued collaborative work among all of these players is critical to advancing the understanding of future verification challenges and building the capacity to address those challenges.

## **Past as Prelude — The Evolution of Verification: A Building-Block Approach**

The ABM Treaty, SALT I, and SALT II shared a common verification philosophy: reliance primarily on National Technical Means (NTM)<sup>1</sup> — satellites, signals intelligence, and aerial reconnaissance. This approach was well-suited to what those agreements sought to monitor. Missile silos, launcher fields, and ABM deployment sites are large, fixed installations, observable from space without requiring inspectors on the ground to verify their status. The use of NTM was protected by both the United States and the Soviet Union agreeing not to interfere with each side's NTM capabilities.

Notably, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union pushed for on-site inspections during the SALT era — the U.S. defense and intelligence communities were themselves concerned that intrusive verification would provide more benefit to the Soviets than to the United States.

This reliance on NTM, however, had a ceiling. As arms control ambitions grew — moving from counting launchers and deployment sites to verifying warhead numbers on specific missiles — satellite observation alone proved insufficient. The INF Treaty (1987) marked the critical inflection point, introducing for the first time a comprehensive, multi-layered regime of intrusive on-site verification that NTM-based agreements had never required.<sup>2</sup> In addition to NTM, this regime included measures like intrusive short-notice on-site inspections, carried out across the full geographic scope of U.S. and Soviet facilities, continuous portal monitoring, and detailed data exchanges.

However, when the U.S. and Soviet negotiators began the negotiation of the INF and START treaties, they were operating in genuinely uncharted territory. Neither side had done anything like it before. They didn't know what verification mechanisms were needed, and even once they began to figure that out, they didn't know how to put them into practice. The result, at least in the early going, was that American negotiators could only offer what they called "placeholder" language in draft texts — gestures toward a general direction rather than concrete proposals. It would take years before specific verification language was ready to be tabled formally.

That experience holds a fundamental lesson: all parties to an arms control negotiation must think through verification mechanisms thoroughly before coming to the table — and not just in the abstract. The practical consequences matter enormously. How do you actually destroy this many systems within a given timeframe? The Soviets grappled with exactly that question during INF negotiations. The Chemical Weapons Convention ran into similar implementation problems.

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<sup>1</sup>National Technical Means refers to intelligence collection capabilities — primarily photoreconnaissance satellites, signals intelligence platforms, and aerial observation assets — used to monitor treaty compliance without requiring access to the other party's territory. The legal basis for NTM in arms control was established in Article XII of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which obligated each party not to interfere with the other's NTM and not to use deliberate concealment measures that impede verification. This non-interference principle was carried forward into SALT II, INF, START I, and New START.

<sup>2</sup>Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), signed December 8, 1987, entered into force June 1, 1988. The inspection protocol is contained in the Protocol on Inspection, which formed an integral part of the treaty. See also Arms Control Association, "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance," *Arms Control Today*, August 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>.

Details that seem secondary can become decisive. The INF negotiations, for instance, required careful distinctions between the internal electronic components of ground-launched cruise missiles and their external flight hardware — the internals had other applications and were difficult to verify as destroyed. Similarly, negotiators spent considerable effort on procedures for eliminating the tractors versus the trailers of missile transporter-erector-launchers, a distinction with real verification implications.

Verification was not, historically, the first thing on anyone's mind. During NATO's 1979 deliberations, it was accepted that any INF agreement would need to be verifiable, but the specifics were never deeply developed before negotiations began. In the end, verification in the INF Treaty proved to be the last major element resolved — precisely because it was the most complex. As negotiator Maynard Glitman observed, it "proved very difficult to agree upon and develop a comprehensive verification regime."<sup>3</sup>

What evolved from that hard-won experience was a building-block model of arms control — each treaty learning from and elaborating upon the last. INF laid the foundation; START built on it; the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) and subsequent agreements continued the progression. As one account put it, the INF Treaty was like a well-designed new house that lacked the finishing touches to make it a home.<sup>4</sup> The negotiators themselves anticipated this, writing the treaty and its protocols as living documents, subject to elaboration and revision over time. START exemplified this. While the text addressing START's central limits fit into a few paragraphs, the procedures detailing their implementation required nearly 350 pages of complex protocols and annexes, including a definitions annex, a verification protocol with multiple annexes, and a conversion and elimination protocol covering the specific tools and procedures that inspectors could use during inspections.<sup>5</sup>

At the INF endgame in Geneva, the outstanding issues were less about grand strategic decisions — those had largely been made — and more about nuts and bolts: how many inspectors, what rights they would have, the specific procedures for eliminating each type of system. Every word set a precedent, and without prior thought, negotiators could find themselves locked into commitments they hadn't fully considered.

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<sup>3</sup>Maynard Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War: An Inside Account of Negotiating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 210. Glitman served as the U.S. Ambassador and chief negotiator for the INF Treaty from 1985 to 1988.

<sup>4</sup>Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War*, 214. The full passage reads: "the Treaty was akin to a new house which was well designed and carefully constructed but which lacked many of the little touches that turns a 'house' into a 'home'." Glitman uses this metaphor to describe the INF Treaty's verification protocols as living documents subject to ongoing elaboration.

<sup>5</sup>Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), signed July 31, 1991, entered into force December 5, 1994. The treaty package included the Treaty text, a Memorandum of Understanding on Data, a Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities, a Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, a Protocol on Notifications, a Protocol on JCIC procedures, and numerous technical annexes. The complete treaty package runs to approximately 350 pages. The full text is available through the U.S. Department of State Office of Treaty Affairs.

The broader implication is clear. Pre-developed, well-researched verification concepts don't eliminate uncertainty, but they give negotiators a crucial head start. They create shared understanding of what is actually feasible to monitor and implement. Verification work is among the most important elements of the arms control enterprise — it's "blue collar diplomacy." It builds trust and cultivates habits of cooperation among experts, diplomats, and military establishments that outlast any single agreement.<sup>6</sup>

One final challenge looms larger today than it did in the INF era: active research and development programs. Future verification frameworks must account for new weapons technologies and modifications to existing systems as they emerge — not just the systems that exist when negotiations begin, but the ones already in the development pipeline and those still existing only in the minds of technical experts.

For example, when the Russians changed the canister for the SS-25 exiting the production facility, the U.S. was no longer able to observe the section of the SS-25 first stage that indicated the difference between it and the banned SS-20 first stage. The Russians suggested that the U.S. develop a computer program that would "see through" the area of the canister now covering the segment, so that it could then be observed. Much to the consternation of the Russian Federation, the U.S. was able to create the program.<sup>7</sup> The START Treaty required the Parties to negotiate how strategic weapons based on "other physical principles" would be covered in the START Treaty.<sup>8</sup> Ideally, verification concepts and the ability to incorporate new concepts needed would be built into new systems from the start, rather than retrofitted and agreed to after the fact.

## **The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Phase III**

The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) was established in 2014 by the U.S. Department of State and the Nuclear Threat Initiative to address what remains one of the most technically and politically demanding challenges in international security: verifying that nuclear weapons have been dismantled and that the materials derived from them

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<sup>6</sup>Remarks by the Dutch Deputy Director General for Political Affairs PJ Kleiweg at the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) Concluding Conference, Utrecht, the Netherlands, December 2025. The conference marked the conclusion of IPNDV Phase III.

<sup>7</sup>This episode is documented in the implementation record of the INF Treaty's portal perimeter monitoring regime at Votkinsk Machine Building Plant. U.S. inspectors were stationed at Votkinsk from 1988 to 2001. The CargoScan radiographic system was developed specifically to address the problem of distinguishing SS-25 first stages from SS-20 second stages once canister configurations changed. See also Glitman, *The Last Battle of the Cold War*, Chapters 6 and 7, for the broader context of the portal monitoring negotiations.

<sup>8</sup>START I Treaty, Article II, paragraph 20, and the associated Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, Annex on Types of New Kinds of Strategic Offensive Arms. The provision obligated the parties to agree on how to account for strategic weapons based on "other physical principles" — a forward-looking clause intended to capture novel delivery systems not yet in existence at the time of the treaty's signature.

have been rendered permanently unusable for building such weapons.<sup>9</sup> Over the decade since its founding, the Partnership brought together thirty countries with and without nuclear weapons, plus the European Union, to develop practical solutions to that challenge. Its work has unfolded in three successive phases, each building upon and extending the last.

### **Building on the Foundation: Phase III in Context**

Phases I and II established the analytic foundation on which all subsequent work has rested. Phase I created a conceptual roadmap centered on a 14-step illustrative model of the nuclear warhead dismantlement process, tracing the journey of a weapon from its removal from a delivery system, through transport and storage, to dismantlement and the final disposition of the special nuclear material (SNM)<sup>10</sup> and high explosive (HE) components. Phase II began to explore the concepts developed in Phase I through a series of exercises and technical demonstrations. This move "from paper to practice," allowed for the development of detailed monitoring and inspection options across each of those steps and assembling them into an initial verification toolkit. Together, these phases demonstrated both the feasibility of meaningful nuclear disarmament verification and the considerable complexity involved in translating conceptual frameworks into operational procedures.

Phase III, which ran from January 2020 through December 2025, addressed the complexities of these frameworks, and how they can build confidence in the verification mechanisms implemented under relevant agreements. In this vein, the Partnership took that foundation and subjected it to more demanding scrutiny. Rather than continuing to work with a one-dimensional verification geometry, the Partnership developed a far more detailed scenario, contemplating a notional multilateral treaty (the Nuclear Weapons Reductions Treaty — NWRT), involving several notional nuclear-armed states. Under the NWRT, Ipindovia and the other parties were obligated to reduce their deployed nuclear arsenals from 1,000 to 500 warheads. The Partners elaborated a detailed portrait of the nuclear weapons enterprise of one of those states — Ipindovia — complete with nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, and bombers, along with their supporting bases and nuclear depots. The NWRT itself included detailed verification provisions, providing the working groups with a realistic legal and operational framework against which to test their analytical conclusions.

At the midpoint of Phase III, in January 2023, the Partners introduced two additional sub-variants of the Ipindovia scenario: a reductions-to-zero scenario, in which states were obligated

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<sup>9</sup>The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification was launched in December 2014 by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). See IPNDV, "About the Partnership," <https://www.ipndv.org/about/>, and NTI, "International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification," <https://www.nti.org/projects/ipndv/>.

<sup>10</sup>Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is a statutory term under U.S. law (Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended) denoting materials capable of sustaining a nuclear fission chain reaction. For treaty purposes, SNM principally comprises plutonium (in any isotopic composition) and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235 to concentrations above natural levels. SNM is subject to IAEA safeguards and, in a disarmament context, requires verified disposition to prevent re-use in nuclear weapons.

to eliminate their nuclear arsenals entirely, and a limitations scenario, in which arsenals were capped at 500 warheads for a defined period. These variants, each with its own working group, allowed the Partners to examine the distinct verification challenges that arise depending on where a state is in the disarmament process. Working alongside these groups, a Cross-Cutting Concepts Working Group and a Technology Track provided analytical continuity across all three scenarios and ensured that conceptual and technological insights informed one another throughout.

### **The Host-Inspector Divide: Shared Interests and Competing Priorities**

Among Phase III's most important contributions was a systematic effort to understand how the perspectives of inspectors and host states differ — and where they align — in the design and implementation of a nuclear disarmament verification regime. This work, carried out by the Inspector Task Group and Host Task Group during the first half of Phase III, produced a nuanced picture of the negotiating and operational dynamics that any future verification agreement will have to navigate.

The working groups identified three levels of verification objectives that structure the relationship between inspectors and hosts. At the first level are the treaty's central verification objectives — the legally binding obligations at the core of any agreement, such as the requirement to reduce deployed warheads from 1,000 to 500. These objectives define the goal the regime is designed to achieve and provide the benchmark against which compliance is ultimately measured. The second level encompasses high-level verification objectives, which translate the treaty's central commitments into operational terms. Both inspectors and hosts share an interest in a regime that is workable — one that allows inspectors to confirm compliance while permitting the host to demonstrate it. Yet tensions emerge here as well, because the host brings to this level a set of overriding concerns that the inspector does not: ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons, protecting proliferation-sensitive information, and minimizing disruptions to ongoing operations. For the host, safety and security in particular are non-negotiable constraints that will shape every aspect of verification planning. The third level — implementation-specific objectives — governs how particular monitoring and inspection processes, procedures, techniques, and technologies (collectively referred to as PPTT)<sup>11</sup> are actually deployed. Here the divergence between inspector and host perspectives becomes most acute. Typically, inspectors prefer comprehensive declarations covering all treaty-related facilities and activities, timely notification of changes, and broad access rights. Hosts prefer narrower declarations, less advance notification of warhead movements, and tightly managed

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<sup>11</sup>Processes, Procedures, Techniques, and Technologies (PPTT) is an analytical framework developed by the IPNDV to categorize and assess the full range of monitoring and inspection tools available for nuclear disarmament verification. The framework allows working groups to evaluate individual verification measures against specific verification tasks within a given scenario. See IPNDV, *Phase III Summary Report: Addressing Complexities and Building Confidence* (December 2025), [https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IPNDVCapstone\\_FINAL-1.pdf](https://www.ipndv.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/IPNDVCapstone_FINAL-1.pdf).

access. How that tension is resolved will be the central negotiating challenge in any future arms control regime.

Managing that tension in practice requires two structural features that the working groups identified as indispensable. The first is a robust framework of managed access provisions — agreed procedures that set boundaries on what inspectors may observe, where they may go, and what equipment they may use, while ensuring that managed access cannot be used to frustrate the fundamental purpose of verification. Critically, the Inspector Task Group affirmed that whenever managed access makes a specific verification activity impossible, the host retains an obligation to provide an alternative means of demonstrating compliance. The second structural feature is a credible dispute resolution mechanism. Because good-faith lapses in implementation are inevitable over the multi-year or multi-decade life of a disarmament agreement — arising from the sheer volume of declarations, the complexity of ongoing nuclear operations, and the normal imperfections of large bureaucratic systems — an agreed process for identifying and resolving anomalies is not merely useful but essential. Without it, minor discrepancies risk escalating into compliance disputes that could undermine the entire regime.

### **An Agenda for the Future: Four Priority Areas**

Phase III produced not only findings and conclusions but also a clear-eyed assessment of the work that remains to be done. That assessment points to four areas where sustained effort is most urgently needed.

The first is concept development and refinement. Several important ideas emerged during Phase III that warrant deeper exploration but were not fully developed before the phase concluded. One is the concept of a "plant-within-a-plant" — a dedicated area within an existing nuclear facility specifically configured to support treaty-mandated inspection activities. Rather than constructing purpose-built dismantlement or storage facilities, which would be prohibitively expensive, complex, and time-consuming, states could instead designate controlled zones within existing sites where verification activities could be carried out under clearly defined conditions. A related but more specific proposal is the creation of a segregated, controlled warhead area in which weapons subject to the treaty would be stored immediately upon arrival from another site, making it easier to establish and maintain chain of custody from the moment of receipt. Both concepts reduce the burden on inspectors and hosts alike while strengthening overall verification effectiveness. Beyond facility design, future conceptual work must give sustained attention to two categories of inspection that have received insufficient treatment: closeout inspections for bases and facilities no longer conducting treaty-related activities, and challenge inspections at sites suspected of hosting undeclared activities. Former nuclear facilities retain latent infrastructure — utilities, storage capacity, security systems — that a state could potentially exploit to circumvent treaty limitations. Such facilities would not ordinarily be subject to routine monitoring after a treaty enters into force. Developing agreed modalities for access to such facilities, drawing on lessons from existing arms control precedents, is therefore a priority. So

too is the question of data management, security, and control. Phase III exercises repeatedly highlighted the importance of maintaining authenticated, accessible records of inspection data across the multi-year span of treaty implementation — a challenge that grows more complex as the volume of data accumulates and as questions arise about who may access it and under what conditions. Finally, the IPNDV has not yet addressed what verification looks like once all nuclear weapons have been eliminated. The long-term maintenance of a global zero world introduces its own distinct set of challenges regarding declarations, breakout pathways, and the role of national and multilateral technical means.

The second priority area is technology assessment and testing. A decade of IPNDV work has established that the international community possesses a substantial array of technology options for nuclear disarmament verification. The challenge is no longer identifying those options in principle but assessing their operational readiness, understanding their limitations, and ensuring they can be adapted to the specific requirements — including information protection requirements — of a real verification regime. Future technology campaigns should continue efforts to refine measurement capabilities for plutonium detection, where considerable progress has already been made, while giving greater priority to the harder problem of detecting highly enriched uranium (HEU), which the Technology Track has consistently identified as the most significant outstanding technical challenge. Parallel work on information barrier systems — technologies that allow measurements to be taken while protecting sensitive design information from inspectors — remains important and should be extended to new applications identified during Phase III. Innovative approaches to unique identifiers, tags, and tamper-indicating seals also deserve attention, including active systems capable of alerting inspectors to unauthorized access and so-called "buddy tag" configurations<sup>12</sup> that link external container markings to internal item identifiers. Emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and machine learning, blockchain-based data validation, and remote fabrication detection, present both opportunities and risks for verification — opportunities to process and authenticate large volumes of inspection data more effectively, and risks if adversaries find ways to exploit or deceive AI-assisted monitoring systems. Giving coherent shape to this work calls for the development of an illustrative five-year technology assessment plan that sets out the most pressing development challenges, evaluates the current state of progress on each, and provides a basis for prioritizing investment.

Third is the need for more ambitious and realistic validation exercises. Tabletop exercises have proven their value throughout the IPNDV's history, but experience during Phase III confirmed that in-person exercises conducted in operationally realistic settings produce richer insights and more durable lessons. Several specific exercises merit priority consideration. An exercise

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<sup>12</sup>A "buddy tag" is a tamper-indicating device configuration in which an internal identifier affixed directly to a nuclear item is cryptographically or physically linked to an external container tag visible to inspectors. The linkage allows inspectors to verify the integrity of the item-container pairing without requiring direct access to the item itself — an important capability for managing the tension between verification effectiveness and protection of sensitive nuclear design information. See IPNDV Technology Track reporting in *Phase III Summary Report* (December 2025).

focused on verifying the absence of nuclear warheads at a facility suspected of concealing undeclared weapons would allow participants to work through the elements of a notional challenge inspection regime — its authorization procedures, modalities, timing, quotas, and the rights of inspectors — in conditions that approximate real-world complexity. An inspection planning exercise centered on a multi-state, multi-year, multi-site reductions-to-zero scenario would illuminate the trade-offs inherent in allocating a finite inspection budget across competing priorities over a treaty's lifetime. The Quad Chart analytic framework<sup>13</sup> developed during Phase III, which uses a structured assessment of PPTT options to evaluate their relative contributions to verification confidence in a given scenario, is well suited to a dedicated two-part exercise: the first part examining how participants would rank and choose among monitoring and inspection options for a specific verification task under defined contextual conditions, and the second exploring how those rankings would shift in response to disruptive events — the failure of a monitoring technology, a change in the verification context, or the unavailability of a preferred access arrangement. More specific exercises should also test PPTT for particularly sensitive steps in the dismantlement process, including warhead transport and SNM disposition, and should include scenarios focused on restoring chain of custody when it has been broken, whether by technical failure, administrative error, or suspected tampering.

The fourth and perhaps most strategically important priority is building and sustaining global capacity. The IPNDV has, over a decade, created something that did not previously exist: a community of experts from nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states alike who share a sophisticated, operationally grounded understanding of what nuclear disarmament verification entails. That community is a strategic asset, but it is not self-sustaining. Experienced practitioners are retiring, institutional memory is diffuse, and the willingness to sustain the Partnership's level of engagement has been under pressure as participants turn over and as competing demands on national resources increase. Sustaining global capacity requires deliberate effort across several dimensions. Continued in-person exercises and technology campaigns provide the hands-on experience that no amount of reading can substitute for. Engagement with the proposed Group of Scientific and Technical Experts (GSTE) on Nuclear Disarmament Verification<sup>14</sup> would allow the insights accumulated through the IPNDV to inform work at the multilateral diplomatic level, extending the Partnership's reach without requiring the Partnership itself to continue in its current form indefinitely. And an annual meeting of stakeholders — drawing together governments, non-governmental organizations, research

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<sup>13</sup>The Quad Chart is an analytic tool developed during IPNDV Phase III to evaluate the relative contributions of specific PPTT options to verification confidence in a given scenario. It is an IPNDV-specific construct distinct from the standard U.S. government quad chart used in acquisition and program management contexts. See IPNDV, *Phase III Summary Report* (December 2025).

<sup>14</sup>The Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (GSTE) is a body proposed under the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to bring together government technical experts to advance the scientific and methodological foundations of nuclear disarmament verification. Its establishment has been discussed in NPT preparatory committee sessions as a mechanism for connecting multilateral diplomatic processes with practical verification work undertaken by initiatives such as the IPNDV. See NPT/CONF.2026/PC.III, Cluster I discussions.

institutions, and academia — would help maintain the broader network of expertise from which future verification efforts will need to draw. The IPNDV has never been the only initiative in this space, and the value of its work is amplified when it is connected to complementary efforts rather than pursued in isolation.

## Need for Future Readiness

History has shown repeatedly that opportunities for nuclear arms control emerge without warning and close just as quickly. The lapse of the New START treaty has created precisely the kind of interlude that past experience suggests should be used productively — not to wait for the diplomatic moment to arrive, but to ensure that when it does, the technical and conceptual groundwork is already in place. The IPNDV's three phases of work have brought that groundwork substantially further along than it was a decade ago. The verification toolkit it has developed, the conceptual frameworks it has refined, and the community of expertise it has built are tangible contributions to the project of making future nuclear arms control not merely aspirational but verifiable. The agenda for future work described here is neither modest nor complete, but it is grounded in a realistic assessment of where the most significant gaps remain — and in the conviction, which the Partnership's decade of experience has consistently reinforced, that those gaps are bridgeable and multilateral nuclear disarmament verification is possible.

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