The IPNDV met in Geneva, Switzerland in June 2024 to commemorate its tenth anniversary. The day-and-a-half program consisted of a mix of senior government official and expert panels, a facilitated discussion of building verification confidence, and slide and poster presentations. Together, these sessions highlighted the significant body of work produced by the Partnership over its decade of operation. The program concluded by exploring challenges for nuclear disarmament verification and possible priorities for future work by IPNDV and other entities. The event was well attended and well received by the nuclear disarmament-focused Geneva diplomatic community, many of whom praised IPNDV’s accomplishments
In conjunction with the anniversary event, the Partners held a two-and-a-half day working meeting to further discuss their respective programs of work. The week ended with the final in a series of tabletop exercises supporting the Sandia National Laboratories’ Multilateral Information Barrier Workshop, a project funded by the Department of State’s Key Verification Assets Fund (V-Fund).
WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES
Limitations Working Group (LWG)
The LWG focused on two areas during the Geneva meeting. First, it identified verification objectives for inspection activities at specific steps in the dismantlement process as a way of creating a hierarchy for concepts of operations. Based on that discussion, it , and from there identified the creation of CONOPs for storage and transport as priorities for future activities. Second, in parallel with the mini-exercise conducted in the RWG, it conducted a mini- exercise exploring how to detect diversion of by retention of excess, undeclared nuclear warheads by Ipindovia. During the discussion, participants identified verifying warhead dismantlement within the context of an active refurbishment program as particularly challenging. This and led to interest in exploring design requirements for a “verification by design” dismantlement facility to better understand what kind of verification activities might be possible and necessary.
Reductions Working Group (RWG)
The RWG’s sub-group on systems-based approaches for verification presented an updated paper on this topic. The paper described Ipindovia’s nuclear weapon enterprise as an overall system to aid thinking about how to most effectively make key verification decisions and trade-offs. The RWG will continue to refine this paper, which is intended to serve as a Phase III deliverable.
Building on the work of two other sub-groups (focused on Processes, Procedures, Techniques and Technologies – PPTTs – and Diversion Pathways Analysis), the RWG conducted a joint mini-exercise that examined the possibilities for diversion of declared or undeclared Treaty-Accountable Items from central storage and the toolkit of PPTTs needed to prevent either scenario.
The RWG intends to conduct another mini-exercise on diversion focused either on Step 1 (deployment) or Step 8 (dismantlement), incorporating lessons learned from the NuDiVe exercise for the latter.
The RWG expressed an interest in meeting with the Technology Track to identify which exact measures and PPTTs could be utilized to counter the identified diversion pathways, and any risks associated with the identified tools and technologies. The RWG provided the Technology Track with a short set of questions related to the effectiveness of specific verification technologies.
The PPTT sub-group plans to continue its elaboration of the new “Four Quadrant Chart” for depicting possible verification processes, procedures, techniques, and technologies (and their interactions) across the 14-steps. It also is considering how to integrate a confidence assessment into the chart for each step. The RWG also plans to meet with the Concepts Working Group to discuss confidence in the context of the PPTTs.
Concepts Working Group (CWG)
The CWG held in-depth discussions on Step 14, the role of confidence, verification strategies, and next steps within Phase III. During a joint session with the Technology Track, discussions centered on Step 14, including critical sub-steps, such as “Component Dismantlement” (14c) and “Material Declassification (14g). Key topics included whether item-by-item tracking is feasible, the handling of small quantities of fissile material, and how to adopt verification strategies from Step 8 while managing constraints related to past projects such as the United States –Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase and the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreements. Participants explored questions about the physical and isotopic changes in materials and the details of the end product during breakout discussions.
On Day 2, presentations highlighted the need for robust verification principles that address both technical and political factors, with a focus on detailed techniques, and on-site inspections. Presentations by working group members covered confidence, the importance of clear definitions, and the impact of quotas on verification; the discussion that followed emphasized the need for interrelated concepts and precise inspection strategies for moving towards global zero. The wrap-up highlighted the importance of in-person meetings for effectiveness and outlined future meeting topics, including verification concepts for Step 14, addressing HEU, and refining quotas and formal frameworks.
Technology Track (TT)
The TT worked with the CWG to facilitate breakout discussions on Step 14, (disposition of components). These discussions focused on the verification challenges associated with the need to change the shape and form of components directly resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear warheads in Step 8 and the isotopic composition of those components in order to protect proliferation-sensitive information during the disposition of end products of nuclear warhead dismantlement. The TT also explored portal monitoring requirements across four verification scenarios and will continue to develop technology options in the portal monitoring subgroup. In the coming months, the TT will also meet with the RWG to respond to their questions regarding technology issues related to diversion and how to counter it with PPTT.
