Working Group 2: On-Site Inspections, co-chaired by Australia and Poland, was tasked to examine activities and techniques for on-site inspection (OSI) that could effectively verify compliance with future disarmament agreements.
This document reflects Working Group 2’s terms of reference, combining its three deliverables with the following outline:
1. Key Elements of OSI for Verification of Nuclear Disarmament Undertakings
- Part I outlines the key elements of OSI for verification of nuclear disarmament undertakings.
- Part II considers potential new inspection procedures, activities, and techniques that could effectively verify compliance with future agreements.
2. Best Practices: Skills, Training Requirements, and Lessons Learned
- Part III examines the limitations related to safety, security, non-proliferation, and national interests that are likely to apply for inspections to monitor nuclear explosive device (NED)* dismantlement and looks at options for managed access.
- Part IV outlines the kinds of skills and training requirements needed for those involved in inspections to monitor NED dismantlement.
3. Proposed Approaches and Topics for Future Development of OSI for Verification of Nuclear Disarmament
- Part V proposes approaches and topics for future development of OSI for verification of nuclear disarmament.
*Throughout this document, the term “Nuclear Explosive Device,” (NED) is used to refer to the
item subject to monitoring and inspection activities. The term “NED” was used to address specific
technical considerations related to the definition of a nuclear weapon that arose during
discussions among experts. Other products produced by the Partnership use the more generic
term “nuclear weapon.” The latter usage is devoid of any specific technical meaning and relies
on a general understanding of the term.
