This paper discusses verification objectives of an inspected state (Host) in a notional nuclear disarmament agreement under which several nuclear -armed states commit to reduce, dismantle, and eliminate part of their nuclear arsenal and verification is carried out by a multilateral body comprising Inspectors from nuclear- and non–nuclear-armed countries. It then considers how those Host objectives shape a state’s perspective regarding what should be the verification provisions of any such agreement and the implementation of such provisions, especially inspections. Building on a short description of different types of declarations and their role in nuclear disarmament verification, this paper subsequently considers Host perspectives on what the content of such declarations should be and how they should be implemented.
The paper draws on analysis conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). It also reflects some of the insights gained from a series of table-top exercises carried out by the IPNDV. To illustrate its points, this paper uses the IPNDV Basic Scenario that has helped structure the IPNDV’s work.