Working Group 2: On-Site Inspections

Consistent with the objectives of assessing monitoring and verification issues: (i) across nuclear weapons lifecycle; and (ii) focusing on nuclear warhead dismantlement and the disposition of the resulting nuclear material to ensure irreversibility of the dismantlement process, Working Group 2 identified:

• The roles and objectives of OSI in verifying future nuclear disarmament undertakings, including by identifying parts of the lifecycle where OSI will be of value;
• The lessons learned from existing regimes related to conventional and nonconventional weapons and their non-proliferation, wherever OSI is used as a verification mechanism.
• A list of options will be compiled for comparison and contrast by the Group with the needs of nuclear disarmament verification. Relevant options will serve as a “pool,” or set of activities and tools related to the different types of facilities, which could be included in future OSI templates/proposals;
• Ways in which verification objectives can be achieved notwithstanding limitations related to safety, security, national interests and non-proliferation inherent in the operations of different types of military, nuclear, and explosive facilities, including through the application of managed access; and
• Desirable knowledge and skills for inspectors, escorts, and support staff at facilities and sites where inspection and/or monitoring activities occur, as well as considerations relevant to the capability and composition of inspection teams.

A document outlining: the key elements of OSI for verification of nuclear disarmament undertakings, potential new inspection activities and techniques that could effectively verify compliance with future agreements as well as options for managed access and their applicability at different types of facilities and sites;

• A “best practices” document highlighting skills, training requirements, and lessons learned from inspectors and facility operators who have OSI experience in diverse environments as well as objectives and broad outline for an inspector training course that would serve as a basis of future capacity building; and
• Proposed approaches and topics for future development of OSI for verification of nuclear disarmament.

Outcomes from the foregoing could be examined through a tabletop exercise if time permits. During the course of its work, WG2, if it deemed necessary, could have expanded on the tasks listed above. Close cooperation with WG1 and WG3 was required, in order to avoid
duplication and secure cohesion.

Robert Floyd of Australia and Marek Sobótka of Poland served as co-chairs for WG2.

The initial program of work will took place over the course of approximately 18 months.

Completed work was briefed to the IPNDV Plenary in November 2017.